When it comes to the truth about radiation and health effects,
there are no experts who are honest - not in government, not in science, not anywhere. Yet, people would rather
listen to liars than challenge their assumptions about the sources of the so-called truth and disregard the purveyors
of actual truth on this topic: the non-creditialed self-taught. - Andrew Kishner, May 18, 2013
The Forgotten Guinea Pigs: A Report on Health Effects of Low-Level
Radiation Sustained As a Result of the Nuclear Weapons Testing Program Conducted
by the United States Government
Download the report here
Report prepared for the use of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, United States House of Representatives, and its Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations
August 1980
[...]
II. A. 6. CONCLUSIONS
Based upon the evidence
presented to the Subcommittee regarding the sheep case, the Subcommittee
concludes that:
(1) the government, having
sufficient reason to know of the hazards associated with radiation exposure,
inexcusably failed to give adequate warning to the sheepmen regarding the danger
posed by the nuclear radiation emitted during the 1953
"Upshot-Knothole" nuclear test series;
(2) the government knowingly disregarded
and suppressed evidence correlating the deaths of the sheep to exposure to
radioactive fallout emitted during the "Upshot-Knothole" test series;
(3) exposure to radioactive
fallout emitted during the "Upshot-Knothole" test series was, more
likely than not, the cause of the 1953 sheep deaths in Utah and Nevada;
(4) the government wrongly
denied compensation to the sheep ranchers for losses incurred as a result of the
government's operation of the nuclear testing program.
[...]
II. B. 5. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the evidence
presented, the Subcommittee concludes that:
(1) the government, despite
having sufficient reason to know of the hazards associated with radiation
exposure, failed to give adequate warning to the residents living downwind from
the test site regarding the dangers posed by the radioactive fallout emitted
during the atmospheric nuclear test operations;
(2) the radiation monitoring
system established by the government during the atmospheric nuclear testing
program was deficient in giving accurate estimates of radiation exposure
necessary to provide adequate health protection to the downwind residents;
(3) the government falsely
interpreted and reported radiation exposure rates so as to give an inaccurate
estimate of the hazards posed to the downwind residents from the atmospheric
radioactive fallout;
(4) the government knowingly
disregarded evidence which questioned the accuracy of the government's
measurements of radioactivity emitted from the test site as well as the adequacy
of the then-employed radiological safety standards; and
(5) exposure to radioactive
fallout emitted during the atmospheric nuclear test operations was, more likely
than not, responsible for the serious adverse health effects suffered by the downwind
residents.
[...]
III. C. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the evidence
presented, the Subcommittee concludes that:
(1) an irreconcilable conflict
existed within the Atomic Energy Commission between the competing functions of
(a) promoting the development of nuclear weapons systems and technology and (b)
controlling their safe production and use;
(2) as a result of these
conflicting functions, the Commission chose to secure, at any cost, the atmospheric
nuclear weapons testing program rather than to protect the health and welfare of
residents of the area who lived downwind from the site;
(3) as a result of its greater
interest in pursuing the development of nuclear weapons systems, the AEC failed
to pursue impartial scientific research on the health hazards posed to the
downwind residents;
(4) these and subsequent
scientific studies of the health effects on the downwind residents, which
indicate an unusually high incidence of leukemia and thyroid cancers, clearly
demonstrate the need for the federal government to conduct and to support
research to determine the actual health impact on the downwind residents; and
(5) the conflict between
promoting nuclear power and controlling its safe production and use continues
today in the AEC's successor agencies - the Department of Energy, the Department
of Defense, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission - and this conflict has been
compounded by placing the lion's share of funds for radiation health research in
these three agencies; the result is to encourage a bias, or an appearance
thereof, in the results of such research.
III. D. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the evidence presented to the
Subcommittee as well as the conclusions reached therefrom, the Subcommittee
recommends that:
(1) the Department of Health
and Human Services; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration; and other appropriate health-related agencies be
given primary responsibility, and funding authority to conduct radiation health
research, with full access to all government information bearing upon any issues
concerning health effects from radiation exposure; and
(2) the government undertake
the necessary radiation health research and continue to support such on-going
studies as those undertaken by the University of Utah and proposed by the States
of Utah, Nevada and Arizona so as to determine the actual health hazards posed
to the downwind residents by the atmospheric radioactive fallout emitted from
the Nevada Test Site.
[...]
IV. D. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the evidence
presented, the Subcommittee concludes that:
(1) the existing legal remedy
provided for under the Federal Tort Claims Act offers no degree of certainty or
predictability regarding questions of causation which are unique to
radiation-related illnesses;
(2) nuclear radiation victims
should not bear any further burdens, particularly in terms of time and expense,
which may be attendant to a judicial resolution of such claims;
(3) the government must accept
responsibility, whether legal or moral, for the injuries sustained by
individuals as a result of the government's operation of the nuclear weapons
testing program; and
(4) a legislative remedy would
provide the most adequate and expeditious means by which the government can
accept and address such responsibility.
IV. E. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the evidence
presented to the Subcommittee and the conclusions reached therefrom, the
Subcommittee recommends that:
(1) Congress should devise a
legislative solution which would address and resolve the questions of causation
for such nuclear radiation-related claims by defining the eligible claimants;
the factors to be specified under the legislation should include: (a) the nature
of the injury, (b) the residence of the eligible claimants, and (c) the time
period and duration of such residence;
(2) an independent panel
should be established to make further determinations respecting illnesses which
may be appropriate for compensation under this legislation; and
(3) the Federal Courts should have
jurisdiction over the questions of eligibility as well as the issues relative to
the determination of damages for compensating nuclear radiation victims under
this legislation.
V. SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS
Atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in the 1950's and 1960's may well
have been essential to secure the national defense. However, because the agency
charged with developing nuclear weapons was more concerned with that goal than
with its other mission of protecting the public from injury, the government
totally failed to provide adequate protection for the residents of the area.
There was sufficient information available from the beginning to suggest that if
it was not possible to conduct the testing outside the continental United
States, then the people living nearby needed protection. The necessary
protection could have been provided by evaluating some of the people but, at a
minimum, the government owed the residents a duty to inform them of the precise
time and place of each test and to instruct them as to what precautions should
be taken. In addition, the government's program for monitoring the health
effects of the tests was inadequate and, more disturbingly, all evidence
suggesting that radiation was having harmful effects, be it on the sheep or the
people, was not only disregarded but actually suppressed.
The greatest irony of our atmospheric nuclear testing program is that the
only victims of U.S. nuclear arms since World War II have been our own people.170 The Subcommittee believes that similar problems can best be avoided
in the future if the responsibility for protecting the people is given to an
agency whose main mission is to assure public health, not to advance nuclear
development.
170 The Subcommittee includes within this context those individuals living in
the trust territories of the Pacific Islands.
More about Nevada testing fallout and downwinders
