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The Forgotten Guinea Pigs: A Report on Health Effects of Low-Level Radiation Sustained As a Result of the Nuclear Weapons Testing Program Conducted by the United States Government 

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Report prepared for the use of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States House of Representatives, and its Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

August 1980 

[...]

II. A. 6. CONCLUSIONS 

    Based upon the evidence presented to the Subcommittee regarding the sheep case, the Subcommittee concludes that:

    (1) the government, having sufficient reason to know of the hazards associated with radiation exposure, inexcusably failed to give adequate warning to the sheepmen regarding the danger posed by the nuclear radiation emitted during the 1953 "Upshot-Knothole" nuclear test series;

    (2) the government knowingly disregarded and suppressed evidence correlating the deaths of the sheep to exposure to radioactive fallout emitted during the "Upshot-Knothole" test series;

    (3) exposure to radioactive fallout emitted during the "Upshot-Knothole" test series was, more likely than not, the cause of the 1953 sheep deaths in Utah and Nevada;

    (4) the government wrongly denied compensation to the sheep ranchers for losses incurred as a result of the government's operation of the nuclear testing program.

[...]

II. B. 5. CONCLUSIONS 

    Based on the evidence presented, the Subcommittee concludes that:

    (1) the government, despite having sufficient reason to know of the hazards associated with radiation exposure, failed to give adequate warning to the residents living downwind from the test site regarding the dangers posed by the radioactive fallout emitted during the atmospheric nuclear test operations;

    (2) the radiation monitoring system established by the government during the atmospheric nuclear testing program was deficient in giving accurate estimates of radiation exposure necessary to provide adequate health protection to the downwind residents;

    (3) the government falsely interpreted and reported radiation exposure rates so as to give an inaccurate estimate of the hazards posed to the downwind residents from the atmospheric radioactive fallout;

    (4) the government knowingly disregarded evidence which questioned the accuracy of the government's measurements of radioactivity emitted from the test site as well as the adequacy of the then-employed radiological safety standards; and

    (5) exposure to radioactive fallout emitted during the atmospheric nuclear test operations was, more likely than not, responsible for the serious adverse health effects suffered by the downwind residents.

[...]

III. C. CONCLUSIONS 

    Based on the evidence presented, the Subcommittee concludes that:

    (1) an irreconcilable conflict existed within the Atomic Energy Commission between the competing functions of (a) promoting the development of nuclear weapons systems and technology and (b) controlling their safe production and use;

    (2) as a result of these conflicting functions, the Commission chose to secure, at any cost, the atmospheric nuclear weapons testing program rather than to protect the health and welfare of residents of the area who lived downwind from the site;

    (3) as a result of its greater interest in pursuing the development of nuclear weapons systems, the AEC failed to pursue impartial scientific research on the health hazards posed to the downwind residents;

    (4) these and subsequent scientific studies of the health effects on the downwind residents, which indicate an unusually high incidence of leukemia and thyroid cancers, clearly demonstrate the need for the federal government to conduct and to support research to determine the actual health impact on the downwind residents; and

    (5) the conflict between promoting nuclear power and controlling its safe production and use continues today in the AEC's successor agencies - the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission - and this conflict has been compounded by placing the lion's share of funds for radiation health research in these three agencies; the result is to encourage a bias, or an appearance thereof, in the results of such research.

III. D. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the evidence presented to the Subcommittee as well as the conclusions reached therefrom, the Subcommittee recommends that:

    (1) the Department of Health and Human Services; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Occupational Safety and Health Administration; and other appropriate health-related agencies be given primary responsibility, and funding authority to conduct radiation health research, with full access to all government information bearing upon any issues concerning health effects from radiation exposure; and

    (2) the government undertake the necessary radiation health research and continue to support such on-going studies as those undertaken by the University of Utah and proposed by the States of Utah, Nevada and Arizona so as to determine the actual health hazards posed to the downwind residents by the atmospheric radioactive fallout emitted from the Nevada Test Site.

[...]

IV. D. CONCLUSIONS

    Based on the evidence presented, the Subcommittee concludes that:

    (1) the existing legal remedy provided for under the Federal Tort Claims Act offers no degree of certainty or predictability regarding questions of causation which are unique to radiation-related illnesses;

    (2) nuclear radiation victims should not bear any further burdens, particularly in terms of time and expense, which may be attendant to a judicial resolution of such claims;

    (3) the government must accept responsibility, whether legal or moral, for the injuries sustained by individuals as a result of the government's operation of the nuclear weapons testing program; and

    (4) a legislative remedy would provide the most adequate and expeditious means by which the government can accept and address such responsibility.

IV. E. RECOMMENDATIONS

    Based on the evidence presented to the Subcommittee and the conclusions reached therefrom, the Subcommittee recommends that:

    (1) Congress should devise a legislative solution which would address and resolve the questions of causation for such nuclear radiation-related claims by defining the eligible claimants; the factors to be specified under the legislation should include: (a) the nature of the injury, (b) the residence of the eligible claimants, and (c) the time period and duration of such residence;

    (2) an independent panel should be established to make further determinations respecting illnesses which may be appropriate for compensation under this legislation; and

    (3) the Federal Courts should have jurisdiction over the questions of eligibility as well as the issues relative to the determination of damages for compensating nuclear radiation victims under this legislation.

V. SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS 

Atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in the 1950�s and 1960�s may well have been essential to secure the national defense. However, because the agency charged with developing nuclear weapons was more concerned with that goal than with its other mission of protecting the public from injury, the government totally failed to provide adequate protection for the residents of the area. There was sufficient information available from the beginning to suggest that if it was not possible to conduct the testing outside the continental United States, then the people living nearby needed protection. The necessary protection could have been provided by evaluating some of the people but, at a minimum, the government owed the residents a duty to inform them of the precise time and place of each test and to instruct them as to what precautions should be taken. In addition, the government�s program for monitoring the health effects of the tests was inadequate and, more disturbingly, all evidence suggesting that radiation was having harmful effects, be it on the sheep or the people, was not only disregarded but actually suppressed. 

The greatest irony of our atmospheric nuclear testing program is that the only victims of U.S. nuclear arms since World War II have been our own people.¹⁷⁰ The Subcommittee believes that similar problems can best be avoided in the future if the responsibility for protecting the people is given to an agency whose main mission is to assure public health, not to advance nuclear development. 

¹⁷⁰ The Subcommittee includes within this context those individuals living in the trust territories of the Pacific Islands.